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Criticisms and rejections of representationalism are increasingly popu-
lar in 4E cognitive science, and especially in radical enactivism. But by 
overfocusing our attention on the debate between radical enactivism and 
classical representationalism, we might miss the woods for the trees, in 
at least two respects: fi rst, by neglecting the relevance of other theoretical 
alternatives about representationalism in cognitive science; and second 
by not seeing how much REC and classical representationalism are in 
agreement concerning basic and problematic issues dealing with mental 
content and intentionality. In order to expand and exemplify these ideas, 
this paper presents two heterodox positions on intentionality and on the 
relations between content and representation. Special attention is paid 
to the way REC is rejecting these positions: I argue that this rejection re-
veals common assumptions with classical representationalism, but also 
undermines the coherence of REC’s conception of intentionality. 
Keywords: Content, intentionality, mental representation, radical 
enactivism, 4E cognition.
Introduction
4E—embodied, embedded, extended and enactive—approaches to cog-
nition are fashionable these days (Newen, De Bruin and Gallagher 
2018). As their names suggest, these approaches insist on the constitu-
tive importance for cognition of its embodied, embedded, enactive and 
extended dimensions. By embodiement, one means the bodily and or-
ganismic realization of cognition, much broader than its neural basis. 
By embeddedness, one means the fact cognitive processes are situated 
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in a biological and cultural environment that supports and constrains 
the way they are acquired and exercised. By enactive, one points to 
the fact perception and action are not separated processes: what one 
does and can do infl uences the way one perceptually experiences the 
world.1 Perceiving is a way to act (Noë 2004). By extended, one argues 
that there are some circumstances in which cognitive processes may 
be literally realized in some of the environmental structures embodied 
agents are reliably coupled with. All in all, cognition is not (only) in the 
head; it is not (only) a matter of mental representations; it unfolds (or 
is “enacted”) in the coupling relations or interactions between embodied 
and living organisms and their social, cultural, linguistic, technologi-
cal and biological environments (Clark 1997; Chemero 2009; Hutto and 
Myin 2013). Notably inspired by original works in robotics, linguistics, 
ecological psychology, and anthropology, but also by the rediscovery of 
phenomenology and pragmatism, 4E approaches criticize the internal-
ist, representationalist, individualist, formalist and reductionist ten-
dencies of the dominant paradigm in cognitive science (computational-
ism).
The theoretical unity of 4E cognition should not be taken for grant-
ed. On the contrary. A typical way to classify 4E views of cognition is 
to consider their respective attitudes towards the issue of represen-
tation and content. This issue concerns the extent to which cognitive 
processes involve the manufacture and use of naturally contentful in-
tracranial states. Some of 4E theories are emphatically non-represen-
tationalist: they deny the existence—and the explanatory necessity of 
positing the existence—of mental representations understood as natu-
rally contentful intracranial states. These theories do not only claim 
that the traditional notion of internal representation is superfl uous; 
they claim that the explanatory appeal to any kind of natural content-
involving intracranial structure is unnecessary and even ontologically 
unjustifi ed. However, they do not deny the existence and explanatory 
relevance of linguistic or propositional content which is derived from 
linguistic practices. Other theories will rather endorse occasional non-
representationalism: some basic or minor cognitive tasks do not re-
quire representationalist explanations, but other, more complex and 
evolved tasks surely require them (cf. for instance Andy Clark’s (1997) 
representation-hungry tasks). But these representations do not need to 
be static, complete, action-neutral or symbolic: they can be action-ori-
ented, context-dependent, non-linguaformal, partial, modal, and so on.
Amongst these burgeoning theories, I will pay here special attention 
to radical enactivism and its rejection of representationalism. Since its 
inception, radical enactivism (or REC, for radical enactive cognition) 
sees itself as a revolutionary project in cognitive science, because of the 
1 It is also possible to understand “enactive” in a broader sense, encompassing 
the necessarily living and embodied character of cognition, as the works of Francisco 
Varela, Shaun Gallagher or Ezequiel Di Paolo show.
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radical non-representationalist theorization it would propose of the 4E 
dimensions of cognition. More exactly, REC would be the equivalent, 
in cognitive science, of the revolutionary changes Einstein achieved for 
matter or Galileo for movement (Hutto and Myin 2017: preface and 
46–47). Not less. Nevertheless, the problem with revolutionary claims 
in science is twofold. Firstly, they are neither necessary nor suffi cient 
for bringing a real revolution. Claiming that you do a revolution does 
not entail by itself the occurrence of a revolution. Recent works have in-
deed begun to question the real revolutionary character of enactivism 
(Wheeler 2017). More broadly, the history of science is full of examples 
where thinkers who considered themselves as orthodox achieved what 
the posterity understood as scientifi c revolutions (take for example Co-
pernicus), and full of examples of self-proclaimed revolutionary theo-
ries or sciences that have been fi nally classifi ed as pseudo-sciences or 
scientifi c failures (see mesmerism or phrenology). Secondly, revolution-
ary claims like Hutto and Myin’s REC give the impression that the 
situation in cognitive science is clear: there are only two opposing al-
ternatives (representationalism or content-involving cognitive science 
(CIC), as REC calls it, and REC), as if the opposition was perfectly real, 
and as if there were no other contenders in the fi eld beyond mere varia-
tions around or between CIC and REC.
In what follows, I will notably show that REC and representation-
alism (or content-involving cognitive science (CIC), as REC calls it) 
are sharing important assumptions. It would be misleading to believe 
that since REC and CIC share these assumptions, these assumptions 
must be central and necessary for any kind of cognitive science. On 
the contrary: I will present positions that reject these assumptions. 
These positions have a heuristic value: assessing and defending their 
scientifi c value will not be my aim here. The assumptions which will be 
under question concern the relations between mental representation 
and mental content, and the status of intentionality in cognitive sci-
ence. Contentless representationalism is a rejection of the identity be-
tween representation and content. Non-intentionalism is a rejection of 
the reality of intentionality as a basic, natural and intrinsic property of 
object-directedness. I will argue that contentless representationalism 
and non-intentionalism are raising challenges for REC and its revolu-
tionary character at different levels: (1) contentless representational-
ism and non-intentionalism are alternative positions in cognitive sci-
ence that are not mere variations around REC or CIC; (2) REC and CIC 
are rejecting contentless representationalism and non-intentionalism 
by sharing common assumptions about intentionality and about the 
equivalence between representation and content; (3) REC’s rejection of 
contentless representationalism is a threat to the intelligibility of its 
very own “nonrepresentational understanding of intentionality” (Hutto 
and Myin 2017: 15).
Section 1 presents contentless representationalism and the way 
REC rejects it by sharing important assumptions with CIC. Section 2 is 
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about REC’s intentionalism and its ambiguities. I will notably discuss 
a reply made by Hutto and Myin (2017) to some objections expressed 
by Jean-Michel Roy (2015).
1. Contentless representationalism 
and defl ationism on mental representations
Let us defi ne representationalism (or CIC) as a commitment to the exis-
tence and theoretical relevance of mental representations, understood 
as material and intracranial entities, naturally endowed with content. 
But what is content? Classically, content is defi ned by truth conditions 
or satisfaction conditions. It may also be identifi ed with abstract se-
mantic entities like meanings, Fregean senses, possible worlds, modes 
of presentations, intensions, or propositions. These defi nitions are not 
identical, of course. But they all share one common methodological as-
sumption: the content of mental representations is defi ned by properties 
which also fi gure in the defi nition of the content of public or linguistic 
representations, namely meaning, reference, truth-conditions, or satis-
faction conditions. The only difference being that unlike the content 
of public/linguistic representations, the content of mental representa-
tions is natural, and thus fi xed by natural properties and relations. 
Daniel Dennett clearly expressed the basic prejudice at the core of this 
standard view of the content of mental representations:
 Whatever mental representations are, they must be understood by anal-
ogy to nonmental representations, such as words, sentences, maps, graphs, 
pictures, charts, statues, telegrams, etc. (Dennett 1978: 189, author’s em-
phasis)
As stipulated theoretical entities, mental representations are never-
theless modeled on a kind of ordinary public representation: linguistic 
representations.
This approach to mental content has been discussed for some time 
now. Examining the way this standard view has been questioned by 
various philosophers will lead us to a basic problem that also concerns 
the eliminativism about content and mental representation developed 
by REC.
From his classical 1989 book Meaning and Mental Representation to 
more recent papers,2 Robert Cummins has argued that there is no need 
to suppose that “representation” and “content”, in cognitive science, 
should have the same explanatory role and the same properties that 
these terms have in folk psychology. “Content”, for instance, should not 
be confused with meaning (the latter one being a property of natural 
languages), defi ned in terms of truth conditions or satisfaction condi-
tions, or associated with reference. Separated from these linguistic 
phenomena, the problem of naturalizing content is not the problem of 
2 See especially the paper co-authored with Martin Roth “Meaning and content 
in cognitive science”, reprinted in Cummins (2010: chap. 11).
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fi nding and defi ning a natural semantic relation between intracranial 
states and environmental states of affairs. Content might just be iden-
tifi ed with functional or inferential role. It is therefore a petitio princi-
pii to assume that the content of mental representations—whatever it 
is—must have properties similar to the ones common-sense associates 
with content, like for instance meaning or truth conditions. As Stephen 
Stich (1983) noted a long time ago, content ascriptions are irreducibly 
vague, context-sensitive, and observer relative. For these reasons, con-
tent as it is ascribed in folk psychology may have no place in scientifi c 
psychology. But that does not mean that the concept of “content” has no 
role to play in cognitive science (Stich 2009: 204), since it is invoked in 
successful theories (Stich 1996: 199). The place of “content” in cognitive 
science can be secured not by naturalizing it, but by defi ning what a 
“successful” theory is, not only from internal features, but also external 
ones (sociological success, entrenched habits of problem-solving,…). Ac-
cording to Cummins and Stich, the content that is invoked in cognitive 
science must be kept apart from meaning, truth-conditionality, and 
more broadly linguistic content. If we follow this strategy of emanci-
pating content in cognitive science from folk or linguistic accounts of 
content, it is a mistake to argue for the elimination of mental represen-
tations from the fact that the content associated to representational en-
tities by the common-sense conception of “mental representation” has 
no scientifi c reality or cannot be naturalized.
We fi nd here a classical problem for any eliminativist argument 
that starts from a classical common-sense characterization of the prop-
erty to be eliminated. As Steven Stich and Stephen Laurence say:
Those arguments typically begin by describing some feature or cluster of 
features that are important or essential for intentional states, on the com-
monsense account of these states. The arguments then try to show that re-
spectable scientifi c theories cannot accommodate states with the features in 
question. (Stich and Laurence, in Stich 1996: 178, emphasis mine)
Eliminativist strategies generally start from a descriptivist model of 
reference, according to which the reference of a term is determined 
by the cluster of descriptions associated with this term, for instance 
descriptions coming from commonsense. The main assumption of a de-
scriptive theory of reference is that if a theoretical concept C refers, it 
refers to whatever is picked out by the description associated with it in 
the theory (Devitt 2009: 46). If nothing satisfi es that description, there 
are good reasons to think that the concept does not refer to anything. 
However, things are different if one endorses a causal theory of refer-
ence: a concept might refer to something whose properties are not the 
ones mentioned by the intension of the concept, especially if this is 
a scientifi c concept whose intension is initially defi ned from common-
sense. The meaning of scientifi c terms may not be fi xed by their inten-
sion; it may be determined by the nature of their referents, as Kripke 
and Putnam taught us a long time ago. A challenge appears for any 
eliminativist position, including REC’s eliminativism on content and 
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mental representation: what are the conditions in virtue of which one 
can say that some entity or property (here: mental representation) does 
not exist, rather than say that it exists, although it is very different 
from what one thought and thinks about it? What are the conditions 
in virtue of which some term does not refer to anything, rather than 
referring to something that is very different from what the descriptions 
associated with it prescribe?
This problem should not only be faced by eliminativists on mental 
content who assume that mental content is necessarily truth-condi-
tional, propositional or conceptual. REC’s acceptance of the fact men-
tal content does not necessarily require truth-conditionality or inten-
sionality must not hide its commitment to a more basic assumption 
whose refusal is suffi cient for blocking REC’s eliminativist strategy: 
the assumption that mental representations necessarily have contents 
(whatever the properties associated with content) and referential prop-
erties. Refusing to endorse one specifi c classical conception of content 
(the conception according to which mental content is necessarily propo-
sitional or truth-conditional) does not mean one is not under the grip of 
a more basic conception of content whose parochial and pre-theoretical 
character may also be questioned. 
Let us call [CONTENT-TRUTH] the claim that natural mental content 
is necessarily truth conditional. This claim may be endorsed by both 
proponents of natural mental content and eliminativists about natu-
ral mental content. As said before, Cummins and Stich have convinc-
ingly argued that [CONTENT-TRUTH] is not the only account of mental 
content which is available in cognitive science. This non-necessity is 
already suffi cient for criticizing eliminativist strategies on mental con-
tent which assume that mental content does not exist because there 
are no truth conditions in intracranial mental structures or in per-
ceptual experience. Failure to naturalize (so that elimination follows) 
truth-conditional or meaningful content does not imply failure to natu-
ralize (and thus the elimination of) another kind of content. REC also 
refuses that [CONTENT-TRUTH] is the only existing account of content 
in cognitive science. More modest accounts of content have been pro-
posed by philosophers such as Tyler Burge, who identifi es content with 
accuracy or veridicality conditions (Burge 2010). REC is also targeted 
at these accounts. Since their fi rst book, Hutto and Myin argue that 
neither informational theories nor teleosemantics are able to provide a 
satisfactory non-intentional explanation of the emergence of semantic 
properties (be they a matter of truth conditions, satisfaction conditions, 
accuracy conditions; be they conceptual or non-conceptual; be they 
propositional or non-propositional): either these theories beg the ques-
tion by already coming with intentional notions, or they merely deliver 
covariation and indication, which are not suffi cient for giving semantic 
or representational content. These failures to naturalize content (what 
REC also calls “The hard problem of content”) entail that representa-
tionalism has no foundations in the naturalistic ontology proponents of 
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representationalism generally assume. Unable to be integrated in the 
naturalistic ontology it claims to be a part of, the representationalist 
program would be “plagued with toxic debt, fi nanced by loans it can-
not pay back” (Hutto and Myin 2013: 160). Since mental content has 
no place in a naturalistic ontology, there are good reasons to think it 
does not exist as an entity conveyed or produced by natural processes, 
including subpersonal and intracranial ones. In addition, non-repre-
sentational means and models are already available and plausible for 
explaining basic cognitive phenomena. And, according to REC, when 
it comes to contentful cognition (thoughts, imaginings or reasonings), 
contents are not natural or subpersonal contents: they derive from the 
integration of cognitive agents in socio-cultural practices.
Hutto and Myin claim that respectable naturalistic theories cannot 
accommodate naturally contentful cognitive states (mental represen-
tations), so that these states should be theoretically eliminated. REC 
assumes here—as a petitio principii—what I will call here [REPRESEN-
TATION-CONTENT-REFERENCE]: the claim that mental representations 
necessarily have content and entertain semantic relations with their 
referents.
In order to clearly defi ne the pivotal role of this (resistible) assump-
tion by REC, let us consider here a reconstruction of Hutto and Myin’s 
strategy in their 2013 book; this strategy has not changed in their 2017 
book:
P1. In the representationalist ontology, the subpersonal and intracra-
nial phenomena named “mental representations” naturally (or in-
trinsically) have contents (truth-conditions, satisfaction-conditions, 
or accuracy conditions) and (by implication) reference3;
P2. There is no natural (or intrinsic) content at the level of subpersonal 
and intracranial phenomena;
C. Subpersonal and intracranial mental representations, as they are 
conceived by the representationalist ontology, do not exist.
P2 is defended from an examination of the failures of projects of natu-
ralizing mental content. A reply from representationalists may consist 
in a criticism of P2. Representationalists can argue that content has 
been naturalized (see Miłkowski 2015), or argue that the fact it has not 
been naturalized yet does not entail it is not naturalizable (and thus 
existing).
Even if P2 is correct (“there is no natural content at the level of 
intracranial and subpersonal phenomena”), the proponents of repre-
sentationalism may also object to the general argument by refusing 
P1 as it is stated by REC. P1 is the description of an alleged consen-
3 I here leave aside the theoretical possibility of representationalist theories 
that would hold that mental representations do not have content, but nevertheless 
have reference. For the all representationalist and non-representationalist theories 
I consider here, content determines reference. Content and reference stand or fall 
together.
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sus: in the representationalist community, everyone would assume 
that mental representations are endowed with natural content. This 
corresponds to [REPRESENTATION-CONTENT-REFERENCE]. Even if REC 
questions the existence of mental content and, therefore, of mental rep-
resentations, it does not disagree with this characterization of mental 
representations: they (are supposed to) have content. “Content” is part 
of the intension putatively fi xing the reference of the concept “mental 
representation”. Representationalists can argue that mental represen-
tations never have natural or intrinsic content (in this case they would 
agree with REC: mental content derives from social and cultural prac-
tices), but they can also argue that mental representations do not have 
content at all, so that P2 has no consequences at all on the existence 
of mental representations. What P1 describes is a situation in which 
commonsense provides the intension from which mental representa-
tions in cognitive science should be conceived: they have content and 
referential properties, just like sentences, pictures or diagrams. But if 
one denies that mental representations have content, P2 has no con-
sequence at all for the existence of mental representations (or for the 
reference of the term “mental representation”).
But are there representationalists that seriously deny P1 and thus 
reject [REPRESENTATION-CONTENT-REFERENCE]? Of course there are. 
Outside of the context of cognitive science, eminent philosophers such 
as Nelson Goodman (1968) or Dan Lloyd (2003) have long questioned 
the idea that the property of representation is a relational property, 
and not (for instance) a monadic property. Let us consider closely the 
case of Noam Chomsky.4 For a long time now, Chomsky is convinced 
that folk and philosophical notions like “content”, “intentionality” and 
“reference” have no place at all in the naturalistic framework dedicat-
ed to the understanding of cognitive faculties (Chomsky 2000: 21–23). 
This is of course much more radical than asserting, like Cummins, that 
“content”, in cognitive science, has a different sense than “content” in 
folk psychology and semantics. As Chomsky writes:
The central problem that troubles me is this. I do not know of any notion of 
‘representational content’ that is clear enough to be invoked in accounts of 
how internal computational systems enter into the life of the organism. And 
to the extent that I can grasp what is intended, it seems to be very question-
able that it points to a profi table path to pursue. (Chomsky 2003: 274)
Nevertheless, for Chomsky, the concept “mental representation” 
should be retained in cognitive science, but “content”, “reference” or 
“intentionality” have to be purged from its intension. That is, Chom-
sky emphatically refuses [REPRESENTATION-CONTENT-REFERENCE]. 
Mental representations are individuated from their role in computa-
tional processing. The functional roles of mental representations are 
here related to properties that have nothing to do with content, ref-
4 In cognitive science, Ray Jackendoff (1987) would have been another possible 
example.
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erence, or intentionality. Their important properties are formal or 
syntactic. These representations do not mean or represent anything; 
defi ning their reference is of no scientifi c interest. One of the reasons 
of Chomsky’s eliminativism on reference, content and intentionality is 
related to the diffi culties of individuating the objects of reference, be 
they actual or purported (Chomsky 2003: 273). The use of intentional 
expressions such as “refers to” or “means” can be preserved for informal 
presentations of a computational theory, but intentional expressions 
play no role in the computational theory itself. The computational the-
ory makes use of the concept “representation”, but this concept is not 
about any relational entity. This does not exclude the introduction of 
a technical notion of reference in order to explain the syntax of mental 
representations (Chomsky 2000: 202 n.6):
The internalist study of language also speaks of “representations” of various 
kinds, including phonetic and semantic representations at the “interface” 
with other systems. But here too we need not ponder what is represented, 
seeking some objective construction from sounds or things. (…) Accessed by 
performance systems, the internal representations of language enter into 
interpretation, thought, and action, but there is no reason to seek any other 
relation to the world, as might be suggested by a well-known philosophical 
tradition and inappropriate analogies from informal usage. (Chomsky 1995: 
53, my emphasis).
“Informal usage”, here, means the very widespread tendency to em-
brace a linguistic model of mental representations, assuming they have 
semantic content or reference, like daily linguistic products. Chomsky’s 
“contentless representations”, as we may call them, entertain function-
al relations with external phenomena: they occur when and only when 
the organism interacts or deals with these external phenomena. In 
this sense, a “number-representation” is a representation of a different 
functional type than a “face-representation”, but is not to be defi ned as 
a representation of an external item (Chomsky 1995: 52).
But what would be the utility and the plausibility of this notion 
of “contentless representation” for cognitive science? A double answer 
might be proposed to this question, one answer justifying why the no-
tion of “contentless representations” might deserve to be used for nam-
ing some specifi c processes, the other one justifying how it is fruitful to 
see those representational processes as being contentless. Firstly, using 
the notion of “representation” for labeling a subpersonal process is here 
a way to underline the fact this process has specifi c cognitive proper-
ties. This subpersonal process functionally contributes to the realiza-
tion of the cognitive abilities of the system (or person) under study, but 
not only. Indeed, these abilities are those which are exercised when the 
system deals with environmental objects, properties or states of affairs 
in tasks such as perceiving, memorizing, or understanding. Represen-
tation-talk is a way for the theorist to individuate and classify these 
cognitive processes, underlining their functional relations with exter-
nal objects. Labeling a structure as a “face-representation”, “phoneme-
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representation”, or “space-representation” is underlining the fact this 
structure plays a role in the relations the cognitive system entertains 
with faces, phonemes or space. Nevertheless, since individuation is not 
defi nition, that does not entail these processes entertain intrinsic se-
mantic relations or reference with these objects, or that they specify 
them in virtue of some content. The relations between these structures 
called “representations” and external objects are not semantic or con-
tentful, but they are more than mere causal relations, because these 
structures are theoretically individuated as playing a key functional 
role in the cognitive processing in relation with these objects and prop-
erties. Still, the defi nition of the formal and syntactical properties of 
those representations is suffi cient for studying their causal role in cog-
nitive processing. Secondly, by considering these representations as 
being “contentless”, one does not introduce into the theory notions (as 
“content”, “reference” or “truth conditions”) fi rst proper to philosophy of 
language, and which immediately raise the thorny issues of naturaliza-
tion and causal effi ciency. How could natural facts generate semantic 
or contentful properties? How could semantic or contentful properties 
be semantically effi cient? Those vexed issues disappear for those who 
dispense with content. Content-ascription can play some auxiliary role 
in the informal presentation of the computational theory, but not with-
in the computational model itself.
As said in the introduction, my aim here is not to assess or to de-
fend the scientifi c plausibility of this marginal position in cognitive 
science (see Rey 2003; Jacob 2010; and Egan 2003 for some existing 
assessments).5 I prefer to focus on the arguments in virtue of which 
this position is (unsurprinsingly) rejected by both REC and its classical 
opponent.
Facing the suggestion of divorcing mental representations from con-
tent, intentionality and reference, both classical representationalists 
and REC might reply that “contentless representation” is an oxymoron. 
And, actually, this is REC’s answer (see Hutto and Myin 2013: 84): if 
something does not have content or reference, why persisting in calling 
5 More broadly, I do not assume here that there is or must be one right (techni-
cal, scientifi cally respectable) way to conceive content and mental representation 
in cognitive science. This realistic assumption might be shared by many represen-
tationalists (who believe in the reality of mental representations) and anti-repr-
esentationalists (who consider that there are facts of the matter in virtue of which 
there are no mental representations); but it is optional. My instrumentalist and more 
precisely pragmatic conception of inquiry in cognitive science leads me to think that 
it is only from local, well-identifi ed cases of cognitive explanations that we can raise 
questions about the (local) usefulness or acceptability of “representation”, “content” 
or “non-representation” talk. This important issue is quite orthogonal to the issue of 
knowing whether REC and representationalism share common elements, or whether 
REC is a coherent position in itself. Still, it informs the pluralistic perspective I 
take in this paper when I argue that we should not believe it is necessary to use 
folk concepts of “content” and “representation” in cognitive science. I thank one 
anonymous referee for having invited me to clarify this point.
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it “representation”? This reply, at least made by REC, assumes that 
representation and content stand and fall together. This assumption 
may be disputed: why should cognitive scientists absolutely respect 
common sense conceptions of “representation”? Take terms such as 
matter, mass, life or length, as they are defi ned and used in contem-
porary science. That is, consider them as scientifi c concepts. Matter, in 
contemporary physics, is not necessarily impenetrable and solid. Mass 
is interchangeable with energy. Life does not necessarily require rep-
lication or reproduction. Length is a function of relative velocity. Are 
these defi nitions invalid or unacceptable on the ground that they do not 
match with ordinary or commonsense understanding of these terms? 
Is there any obligation for scientists to forge new terms because of the 
confusions these new uses of entrenched terms can generate? Is there 
any naturalist philosopher that wants to subject theories in chemistry, 
biology or physics to the authority of ordinary language? Is there any 
naturalist philosopher that would argue that psychology and cognitive 
science—unlike natural sciences—must be subjected to this authority, 
and that will thus reject the possibility there might be contentless men-
tal representations? This is a fi rst set of questions that may follow from 
REC’s dismissal of contentless representationalism.
Pursuing my project of focusing on REC’s treatment of contentless 
representationalism, let me note another point (and problem). Hutto 
and Myin sometimes reduce Chomsky’s position to the following claim: 
since “mental representation” does not pick out any contentful or ref-
erential state, it picks out any property of brains that we have not ex-
actly defi ned yet. “Mental representation” would be a mere label that 
picks out whatever, in the end, best characterizes what does the work 
in cognition. The obvious reply REC proposes to this defi nition is that, 
in the end, mental representations would be everywhere, the concept 
being applied to any kind of mediating state (Hutto and Myin 2019: 8). 
Hutto and Myin’s objection is instructive: they are warning non-
orthodox representationalists who want to give up content (as Chom-
sky) that their representationalist ontology is under the threat of pan-
representationalism. Mental representations would be everywhere, 
in any mediating (and contentless) physical state. Hutto and Myin’s 
objection assumes that content is the only good criterion for preserving 
an intelligible form of representationalism. But, of course, because of 
content, this form of representationalism would then face the “Hard 
Problem of Content” and hence the prospects of elimination. Put other-
wise, Hutto and Myin invite all representationalists to endorse a spe-
cifi c view of mental representation, so that eliminativism about content 
can automatically generate eliminativism on mental representation. 
The non-orthodox, defl ationary contentless representationalist would 
be trapped in a dilemma, between the hard problem of content and 
pan-representationalism:
The defl ationist’s dilemma is this: either retain mental contents and their 
164 P. Steiner, Content, Mental Representation and Intentionality
troublesome properties or let go of mental contents and offer a theory of 
mental representation that is indistinguishable from non-representational-
ist accounts. (Hutto and Myin 2019: 22)
The upshot of this strategy is twofold: on the one hand, in order to 
criticize representationalism, REC is forced to endorse a basic tenet 
of classical representationalism (mental representations have content 
and reference), and might more broadly share with classical represen-
tationalism an occasional reference to common sense as a landmark 
in the characterization of the acceptable and unacceptable posits of 
cognitive science (indeed, as seen above, according to REC there is no 
representation without content, and “contentless representation” is an 
oxymoron). On the other hand, by addressing a dilemma to defl ation-
ists, one can wonder whether Hutto and Myin are not cutting off the 
branch they are sitting on regarding their very own conception of inten-
tionality. Indeed, if there is no natural content and therefore no mental 
representations, why should there be intentionality? If intentionality is 
contentless, how should and could one distinguish intentionality from 
non-intentional phenomena? Is there not now a lurking problem of 
pan-intentionalism? This will be the topic of the next section.
2. Non-representationalism 
and intentional realism: How low can you go?
Any textbook in philosophy of mind will reveal that the property of 
“intentionality” is a fundamental property of minds. But what is in-
tentionality? Apart from the basic idea of intentionality as a relation 
between minds and world, consensual defi nitions are hard to fi nd; met-
aphors abound. Linguistic models are often convoked for defi ning and 
individuating intentional states: reference, representation meaning 
and content would be proper to intentional states. Here is for instance 
John Searle:
Intentional states represent objects and states of affairs in the same sense 
of ‘represent’ that speech acts represent objects and states of affairs. (Searle 
1983: 4)
Associating intentionality with representation is the core of the repre-
sentational theory of intentionality (Cummins 1989: chapter 1; Morgan 
and Piccinini 2018). According to it, the contents of intentional states 
are mental representations. In order for S to be intentionally related 
to O, there must be a mental representation of O in S. This works for 
intentional relations with objects, but also with propositions (Field 
1979; Fodor 1985). Representationalist theories of intentionality of-
ten equate intentionality with representation and content. Intentional 
states would be contentful states, or states that represent objects. The 
problem of intentionality would be the problem of explaining how some 
entities can represent or stand for other entities (Stalnaker 1984: 6). 
This ambiguity or even confusion between representation and inten-
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tionality has some theoretical advantages: it easily gives the impres-
sion that intentionality can have a causal role in the physical world, 
in virtue of the physical and formal properties of its representational 
vehicles.
Because of its anti-representationalism, REC cannot be suspected 
to endorse a form of representational intentionalism. But there is a 
more basic tension than the tension between representationalism and 
non-representationalism when one wants to offer an account of inten-
tionality. It is the tension between intentional realism (or intentional-
ism) and non-intentionalism. And, from the perspective of this basic 
tension, REC and representationalism are in the same boat: they en-
dorse (different versions of) intentionalism—like other enactive theo-
ries of cognition (Varela 1992, Thompson 2007, Gallagher 2017, Noë 
2004) I will not discuss here.
For REC, basic cognition is a matter of embodied engagements re-
sponding to wordly offerings or informations in the environment (Hutto 
and Myin 2017: 130). These responses do not involve contents; but they 
must be explained, and in particular their connecting properties with 
the world:
Anyone who claims that cognition is entirely a matter of contentless com-
putations—for example anyone who allows that content falls out of the 
equation entirely, and offers no successor notion—will be unable to explain 
how organisms relate to and connect with targeted aspects of their wordly 
environments. Any theory of this extremely austere sort will be woefully 
ill-equipped to explain the array of fi ndings that give us reason to think 
that cognitive activity is deeply infl uenced by E-factors. (Hutto and Myin 
2017: 59)
Getting rid of content is not suffi cient for being revolutionary. You also 
need to provide an alternative (that is, contentless) story to a classical 
question: how do organisms relate to aspects of the world? Answering 
to this question is pressing, especially if one holds that cognition is 
embodied, extended and embedded: how can agents relate to parts of 
the world that are infl uencing and even constituting their cognitive 
operations? Facing this challenge, the own explanans of REC is inten-
tionality or more precisely Ur-intentionality, the “most primitive form 
of intentionality” (2017: 96). Intentionality is thus, for REC, the basic 
operator that will ground a 4E approach to cognition:
REC questions whether, on close inspection, there is a need to posit any 
kind of content at the basement level of cognition in order for the sciences 
of the mind to do their fundamental explanatory work. On the positive side, 
REC recommends getting by with something less—an alternative, content-
less notion of intentionality. In short REC avoids a host of intractable prob-
lems—most prominently the HPC [Hard Problem of Content] and the prob-
lem of mental causation—by sticking with the idea that organisms target 
chunks of the world without assuming semantic contents make any causal 
or other explanatory contribution when it comes to saying how such target-
ing is possible. (Hutto and Myin 2017: 60, my emphasis)
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To put it in a nutshell: “basic minds target, but do not contentfully 
represent, specifi c objects and states of affairs” (Hutto and Myin 2017: 
130). Already in their 2013 book, Hutto and Myin stated that organ-
isms exhibit “intentional directedness” towards aspects of their envi-
ronment (2013: 81) (see also Hutto 2008: chapter 3 on the differences 
between intentional attitudes and propositional attitudes). This in-
tentionality is a property of organisms, and not of mental or physical 
states inside of these organisms.
REC therefore endorses a form of intentional realism (or intention-
alism): intentionality is a real, natural and intrinsic property of organ-
isms. It is not a matter of observation, description, and interpretation. 
Organisms display Ur-intentionality independently of what one may 
think or say about them, and independently of their possible inclusion 
in socio-cultural practices. The “reality” of intentionality amounts to 
its being natural, and naturalizable from the resources of teleosemiot-
ics. Intentionality is neither magic nor given: intentionality has been 
shaped through ontogenetic and phylogenetic history (Hutto and Myin 
2017: 108, 130; Hutto and Myin 2013: 111).
This defi nition of intentional realism is very distinct from classical 
defi nitions and forms of intentional realism, which systematically as-
sociate intentionality with content and representations. Being realist 
about intentionality would be being realist about the existence of men-
tal content, propositional attitudes and mental representations (see for 
example Jacob 1997: chapter 1). Conversely, anti-realism about inten-
tionality would be the idea that there is no “fact of the matter about 
what a person (or a person’s mental state) really means” (Dennett 1987: 
294). Since REC urges us to divorce intentionality from meaning and 
representation, its form of intentional realism must not involve con-
tent, intensionality, meaning or representation in the very defi nition 
of intentionality. What is real, in REC’s intentionalism, is the prop-
erty of “aiming at” or “pointing towards” worldly offerings (Hutto and 
Satne 2015: 530, note 7). Indeed, if linguistic landmarks and represen-
tationalist descriptions are refused for defi ning intentionality, other 
metaphors can be used. Metaphors such as “aiming at”, “targeting” or 
“pointing” are supposed to suggest the core of intentionality, echoing 
the etymology of the word (cf. the latin verb “intendere”, “aiming at 
something”). Even though REC gives up representationalist and se-
mantic readings of aboutness, it keeps the idea of intentionality as a 
real power of organisms. Being realist about intentionality is consider-
ing that the aboutness of mental states is the result of their having an 
(intrinsic) power of aiming at, or being directed to, objects. There is a 
pointing-beyond-itself which is characteristic of some entities.
For non-realism about intentionality, there is no intrinsic inten-
tionality, be it contentful or not. Nature does not produce meaning or 
content (on this point, Hutto and Myin are right), but not only: the 
aboutness of mental states and organisms is not a matter of their being 
intrinsically aimed or targeted at something (it is here that Hutto and 
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Myin disagree with non-realism about intentionality). More precisely, 
one version of non-realism will argue that directedness to objects is so 
pervasive and trivial in nature that it is insuffi ciently interesting and 
specifi c for providing that philosophical property intentionalists like 
Hutto and Myin name “intentionality” (Rosenberg 2013: 2015). Inten-
tionality can for instance rather be a property of the linguistic articu-
lation of cognitive and mental attitudes. Another version will argue 
that object-directedness is always observer-dependent, and thus never 
intrinsic (some versions of Maturana-inspired autopoietic enactivism 
endorse this idea).6 One proof of the proximity between REC and its 
classical representationalist “opponent” is their common reaction to 
non-realism about intentionality: incredulity. As an example of the im-
portant foundational role it gives to intentionality as a real property, 
one may consider REC’s criticism of neo-pragmatist accounts of inten-
tionality, which hold that all intentional properties are derived from 
linguistic and social practices. For REC, the denial of natural inten-
tionality entails that neo-pragmatism has no means “of accounting for 
the kinds of intelligent thinking that are needed for explaining partici-
pation in the relevant socio-cultural practices” (Hutto and Satne 2015). 
In short, a natural and real form of intentionality would exist, and 
would be the only way of explaining basic forms of intelligent think-
ing—as if other (non-intentional) answers and proposals were a priori 
unavailable or considered as dead ends or non-starters.
The intentional realism (or intentionalism) of REC can raise sus-
picion from two very different sides: for representationalist intention-
alists, REC’s intentionality is not intentionality, because it does not 
involve representational properties or content. For non-realism about 
intentionality, REC’s intentionality is so low and basic that it is virtu-
ally indistinguishable from non-intentional relations (we here meet the 
dilemma presented in the fi rst part of the paper). In order to develop 
this last point, two supplementary remarks must be made.
First, REC’s intentional realism embraces the classical picture of 
intentionality as a relation to objects. Intentionality is object-directed-
ness. If the frog is intentionally related to the world, it is because it 
is related to objects, and not mere things: it is related to entities that 
have a specifi c behavioural profi le (Hutto and Myin 2017: 111–112). It 
aims at objects, because object-directedness is defi ned, since Brentano, 
as a core property of intentionality.
Second, REC is at pains to insist on the fact that being intentionally 
directed at something is not only being disposed to do something; it has 
a normative dimension. More exactly, what is intentionally targeted 
is normatively fi xed by past interactions between organisms and their 
environment (Hutto and Myin 2017: 112). The natural attunement be-
tween organisms and their environments in the past not only struc-
tures the profi le of an organism’s current tendencies for response, it 
6 See Abramova and Villalobos (2015).
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normatively fi xes what is intentionally targeted, in complicated ways 
across multiple spatial and temporal scales.
These two remarks can help us to understand how Hutto and Myin 
were able to respond to an important objection regarding the reality of 
their own “Ur-intentionality”. As Roy (2015) was one of the fi rst com-
mentators to notice, the main challenge of REC’s intentionalism is to 
show how a non-semantic and contentless relation between organisms 
and parts of the world should nevertheless be seen as an intentional re-
lation. One can address this challenge to REC without being a (covert)
representationalist.7 Indeed, one can reject the existence of Ur-inten-
tionality not because it is contentless or devoid of semantic properties, 
but because it seems to correspond to a relation which is so basic and 
pervasive that it is useless and misleading to call it “intentionality”. 
There are, to be true, “biologically forged mind-world connections”, and 
indeed, they do not have “to be characterized in semantic terms” (Hut-
to and Myin 2017: 108). But, more fundamentally, why turning these 
“natural involvement relations” (Godfrey-Smith 2006: 60) or “natural 
attunement relations” (Roy 2015) into intentional relations? If they 
are so basic, why seeing them as intentional? (and not: “if they are 
not semantic, why seeing them as intentional?”). There are two an-
swers provided by Hutto and Myin: a broad answer, already mentioned 
above, arguing that it is necessary to see these relations as intentional 
relations if one wants to understand how cognitive organisms connect 
to their environment. In line with intentionalists, REC considers that 
the relation between organisms and their world is a scientifi c question, 
and that intentionality is the (scientifi c) answer to it8. And there is a 
narrow, and more technical answer, straightforwardly directed to Roy’s 
question (Roy 2015: 123), who asked why the directedness organisms 
have towards elements of their environment should be understood in 
terms of intentional directedness to objects, and not merely in terms of 
behavioural attunement. To this objection, Hutto and Myin replied in 
their 2017 book:
It is because REC casts Ur-intentionality in normative terms that it does 
not equate basic intentional directedness “to a sort of property of natural 
attunement and thus loses its connection with… objectivation” (Roy 2015). 
(Hutto and Myin 2017: 112)
It is thus the normative character of the targeting that grounds 
the objective dimensions of intentionality and more broadly that pre-
serves the place of intentionality in a naturalistic framework. Indeed, 
as Hutto and Myin say, “it is precisely because REC makes room for at 
7 Contrary to what Hutto and Satne (2015: ft.7) suggest, when they say that 
the ones who reject Ur-intentionality proceed by defi ning intentionality in terms of 
content. That is an incorrect characterization of all their possible opponents.
8 This can be contrasted with Dennett’s non-intentionalism: “The phenomena 
of intentionality are both utterly familiar—as salient in our daily lives as our food, 
furniture, and clothes—and systematically elusive from scientifi c perspectives” 
(Dennett 2013: 64).
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least this much normativity that it differs from the eliminativist, strict 
naturalist approaches (…)” (2017: 112). Normativity makes for objecti-
vation, which is the defi ning feature of intentionality.
I would like now to discuss Hutto and Myin’s reply to Roy: is this 
reply suffi ciently clear and coherent for dispelling non-intentionalist 
worries?
(1) Normativity and objectivity.
Let us accept that natural normativity is real, and not observer-depen-
dent. Let us accept, by charity, that “there are historical facts about 
what ancestral organisms interacted with in their environments that 
shaped, and currently constrain, the response profi les of members of 
any given species” (Hutto and Satne 2016). How is that suffi cient for 
positing intentionality as the power of targeting objects? That is, how 
should the presence of normativity be suffi cient for providing object-di-
rectedness, which is seen by REC as the defi ning feature of intentional-
ity? Representationalist intentionalism will ground object-directedness 
on representational content (content is the aspect under which a thing 
is apprehended, and is thus an object for a mind); this road is not avail-
able to REC, but can normativity do the main work here?
There are many devices in nature (hearts, kidneys, intestines…) 
that function normatively, if we stick to REC’s characterization of nor-
mativity, but that does not make them devices which are targeted to-
wards objects. Organs selectively respond to viruses and bacteria; does 
this mean they are targeted to viruses or bacteria as objects, and are 
thus intentional systems? A threat of bloat (or pan-intentionalism) ap-
pears: we met it at the end of section I concerning contentless repre-
sentation (if a mental representation is just a mediating structure, why 
should not the world be full of mental representations?). We meet it 
now for intentionality: if intentionality is a capacity of living systems 
to target (with possible error) objects, this capacity being subject to 
history and norms, then why are not sunfl owers, kidneys, bacteria and 
intestines bearers of intentionality? 
If REC challenges Chomsky’s contentless representationalism by 
arguing that it entails that mental representations are everywhere, 
this challenge should also concern their own position concerning in-
tentionality. Why being so demanding for content and representation 
(nothing in nature can constitute them) and so liberal for intentionality 
(it is enough, for intentionality, to be made out of normative relations)? 
The objection according to which objective transitivity (being directed to 
objects) is too broad and general for defi ning intentionality as a defi n-
ing feature of cognitive or mental systems is not new: it was already 
addressed by Edward Titchener (1909: chap. 2) to Brentano’s idea that 
intentionality would be the defi ning mark of mental phenomena.
REC is not alone facing this problem of pan-intentionalism. And it 
might transform this problem into a basic commitment: there is inten-
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tionality as soon as there is life. REC can here join forces with some 
versions of autopoietic enactivism which do not hesitate to see basic 
forms of intentionality in very basic living systems, like bacteria (Vare-
la 1992).9 For REC too, simplest life forms are capable of an intention-
ally directed responding and directedness (Hutto and Myin 2013: 36), 
although REC is suspicious towards the use of concepts like “mean-
ing”, “contents”, “sense-making” and “signifi cance” for describing the 
responses of simple living systems (2013: 35). “Basic interest-driven 
ways of responding” would be the right platform for understanding how 
mentality can be intentionally directed (2013: 36). Agreeing with these 
intentionalist versions of autopoeitic enactivism, and accepting that 
intentionality is present as soon as there is life, REC would also not 
be very far from Tecumsey Fitch’s model of nano-intentionality (Fitch 
2008): there is already an intrinsic goal-directedness inherent in the 
behaviour of living eukaryotic cells, and more precisely a goal-direct-
ed capacity to respond adaptively to novel circumstances, by arrang-
ing and rearranging molecules in a locally-functional manner, based 
on past history. In doing so, cells autonomously arrange their form in 
such a way as to optimize their ability to perform certain quite specifi c 
functions. Of course, goal-directedness is not object-directedness. It re-
mains to be seen whether Fitch’s nano-intentionality exhibits the es-
sential feature of objectivation which is classically associated with in-
tentionality. Be that as it may, by going biological about intentionality, 
REC would meet again the threat of pan-intentionalism: there would 
be intentionality everywhere there are basic biological systems such 
as cells and bacteria. Intentionality would become a universal generic 
property of living systems, and we would need many specifi c distinc-
tions inside of the realm of living beings in order to account for the dif-
ferences and the relations between, for instance, the intentionality of 
bacteria, the intentionality of protozoa, the intentionality of an organ, 
and the intentionality of an organism. What would be the relations 
between, say, the Ur-intentionality of the organism and the intention-
ality of the billions of cells it is made of, and the relations between this 
organismic Ur-intentionality and the intentionality of propositionally 
contentful mental states? Moreover, if REC considers that intentional-
ity (as object-directedness) is already present in cells, it owes us a new 
defi nition of the role of intentionality in cognitive science. How much 
would intentionality be a specifi c cognitive property or phenomenon 
studied by cognitive science (and not biology)? Does it also entail that 
artifi cial creatures cannot exhibit intentionality or harbour states hav-
ing intentionality?
9 See Abramova and Villalobos (2015) for a non-intentionalist version of 
autopoietic theory: even contentless, intentionality as directedness is a case of 
anthropomorphic projection which is ascribed by the observer to the organism.
 P. Steiner, Content, Mental Representation and Intentionality 171
(2) The place of intentionality in nature.
By getting rid of content, REC escapes the problem of explaining how 
semantic properties can be causally effi cacious, but it does not escape 
the problem of accounting for the causal role of intentionality in na-
ture. If intentionality is a real-intrinsic property of organisms that de-
serves to fi gure in our best theories of cognition, the least we may ask 
is this: what difference does this property make? REC will answer by 
saying that intentionality is what allows organisms to be related to 
specifi c aspects of their environment. Very well, but an explanation of 
how intentionality works for achieving that role is still required. The 
causal role of intentionality cannot be, of course, a matter of mental 
representations; REC will rather appeal to the instantiation of inten-
tionality in behavioural dispositions shaped by evolutionary history 
(Hutto and Myin 2017: chap. 5). However, why should intentionality 
be something more than a name for qualifying these dispositions? It is 
not because you may describe organisms having dispositions with the 
use of the intentional idiom (“aims”, “targets”, “is directed towards”…) 
that organisms become intentional agents for real. Organisms have 
propensities and dispositions, products of a long history and learning. 
Intentionality might not be distinct from them; it might just be a way 
to describe these propensities and dispositions, and especially their 
objects-involving manifestations.
From these two objections, we can now paraphrase the dilemma 
REC stated for contentless representationalism as follows, and target 
it towards the challenge of explaining the nature and the causal role 
of Ur-intentionality: “either retain mental contents and their trouble-
some properties or let go of mental contents and offer a theory of inten-
tionality that is indistinguishable from non-intentionalist accounts”. In 
sum, Hutto and Myin’s radical view of intentionality, stripped of all its 
representationalist apparatus, allows us to inquire over the very idea 
of intentionality: what is this special capacity or power of minds (or 
organisms) to target some objects? Is there any? Should there be any?
Conclusion
REC’s criticism of representationalism assumes that mental represen-
tations (if any) have content (whatever its properties) and reference. 
This assumption is refused by some varieties of representationalism, 
as contentless representationalism, which is therefore left untouched 
by the anti-representationalist strategy of REC. Moreover, this as-
sumption is shared by REC’s best enemy: content-involving cognitive 
science. In order to defuse the plausibility of contentless representa-
tionalism, REC has expressed a dilemma; but this dilemma can also 
be applied to its own positive model of (non-representational) inten-
tionality. Like CIC and more broadly classical cognitive science, REC 
considers that intentionality is a basic property of cognitive systems. 
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However, the way it characterizes intentionality seems insuffi cient for 
distinguishing intentionality from non-intentional relations, unless 
one accepts intentionality is present in every living system.
Up to now, there has not been a real debate between REC and clas-
sical representationalism, perhaps because proponents of the latter 
one believe proponents of REC live in a very different world. Hence dis-
dain or incredulity. But they are not living in a different world: on some 
aspects, REC and classical representationalism are sharing important 
presuppositions that may be at the origins of some of the problems they 
respectively face. REC is not necessarily revolutionary: it retains some 
crucial assumptions shared with CIC, as the equation between repre-
sentation and content, and intentionalism. Nevertheless, it may well 
be radical, in the sense that it forces us to focus on these foundational 
issues more clearly and demandingly than before.
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